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I. RETIREMENT IN A LIFE CYCLE CONTEXT
A. The Problem
This review of existing theoretical and empirical models
of the effects of pensions and earnings on retirement is
guided by life cycle theory. The individual's problem is to choose
the optimal amount of work to do in each of the remaining
T years of life. "Optimal" is defined as the labor supply
path that maximizes lifetime utility, a function of consumption
and leisure. An individual's income possibilities are constrained
by his lifetime earning capacity and his pension opportunities
(including both employer-provided benefits and Social Security
payments). Thus, a life cycle framework leads immediately to
a structure in which the lifetime labor supply path (1) is a
function of the lifetime streams of earnings ()) pensions ()
and other pertinent explanatory variables ():
-)-(1) H = L(E, P, X).
Various aspects of the labor supply vector may be
selected for analysis: whether or how much the individual
is working as of some age, whether or how much he is working
as of some calendar date, whether he retires early or not,
or his age of retirement. Regardless of which of these
measures is used as the dependent variable, to be true to
life cycle theory, the independent variables in equation (1)
must be expressed as streams and not just in terms of their
current levels. Models without this feature are fundamentally
flawed.
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Another evaluation standard used in this review is
sensitivity of the various models to essential institutional
features of pensions. One such feature is that pensions,
unlike most other economic assets, have a contingency pro—
vision: to receive a pension, one typically must not work.'
Secondly, pension benefits per year typically increase if
retirement is deferred.2 And thirdly, whereas some pension
plans are actuarially neutral,3 most are not.4 Models which
neglect the contingency provision, the increase in pensions
if reitrernent is delayed,' the possibility of actuarial non-
neutrality run the risk of reaching conclusions of quite
limited applicability.
'Employers usually require that the worker cease employment
before pension benefits are initiated. Social Security
pensions are subject to an earnings test; after $5,000 is
earned, each extra dollar of earnings reduces Social Security
benefits by fifty cents.
2This is true of defined contribution plans (such as TIAA—CREF)
for three reasons: later retirement adds to the number of
dollars contributed, allows previous contributions to accumulate
an additional year's interest, and permits an actuarial
increase in annual benefits because the expected payout period
is shortened. Plans which specify benefits rather than
contributions (including most employer-provided pension plans
as well as Social Security) usually provide more benefits to
those who work longer, because of increased years of service,
raises in the wage base, and a shorter expected payout period.
3"Acutarial neutrality" means that for all possible retirement
ages, the present discounted value of pension benefits over
the remainder of one's lifetime is equal to the accumualted
value of pension contributions up to that time.
4See, for example, Lazear (1981) on private pensions and
Burkhaus.er and Warlick on Social Security.
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B. Rules for Utility Maximization in a Life Cycle Context
The foregoing features are easily combined into a quite
general framework. In this section, we use this model to
derive rules characterizing optimal retirement behavior.
Sections II and III compare existing theoretical and empirical
studies against this framework.
Utility (U) is a positive function of the lifetime
consumption vector () and of the lifetime leisure vector ()
(2.a) U = U(,) , tJ1>O, U2>O.
Consumption increases with income ()
(2.b) C = C(Y), C'>O.
Income depends positively on earnings (net of taxes and pension
contributions) until retirement (R), (E1, E2, . . . , ER),
and on pension benefits in each remaining year of life,
1/2/
(2.c) 'i = Y(E1, E2, . . . ER; R+l' R+2' '
Yt>o Vt.
Let be some aspect of working that increases pension benefits.3
If retirement is postponed, or if is greater, the benefit
in each year after retirement is higher:
1/
The length of life (T) is assumed known with certainty.
2/
If work in a post-retirement job is allowed for, an extra
vector of terms running from R+l to T would enter into (2.c).
To avoid complicating the model further, we assume in what
follows that post-retirement work is not chosen, either because
the option is not available or because the individual does not
elect it.
3/
might alternatively be years of service, wage in the highest
u years preceding retirement, contributions to a pension
fund, or some combination of these.
—4—
(2.d) Pt = Pt' Pt >0, Pt >0.1 2
Let the aspect of working that affects pension benefits, (tb) be
a non-decreasing function of lifetime labor (a).
(2.e) t = W(), W'>0.
Finally, hours of work (ii) and of leisure () exhaust the hours
in a year:
(2.f) + = constant>.
Collapsing (2a—f) into a single equation, we have:
(3) U = U{C[El,...ER; PR+l(W(),R),...,PT(W(L),R)]}
The individual's goal is to maximize utility U by choice of a
labor supply path . The control variable is the amount of
labor supplied in each period.
Consider what happens if the individual supplies more labor.
The intensive and extensive margin may be distinguished:
a) Extra hours of work within some year holding the
the nunber of years in the work life constant.
Such an increase in labor supply on the intensive margin
has four effects: it may raise earnings, it may raise pension
benefit per year, it leaves unchanged the number of years of
pension benefits, and it reduces leisure.
A[E11... ,ER](4a) Mi. > 0;
-
L,P
> 0, Vt>R;
J
1R
— 0,
<0.
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Taken by themselves, each of the first two effects may raise
utility, while the fourth effect, by itself, lowers utility.
Hence, whether extra hours of work raise or lower utility is
ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the particular
individual'sutility function and income opportunities. Utility
is maximized when no possible change in hours produces
income gains worth more than the loss of leisure.
b) Extra years of work holding the number of work hours
in a year constant.
Such an increase in labor supply from Rorig to Rnew has four
effects on the extensive margin: raises earnings, raises
pension benefit per year, lowers the number of years during
which pension benefits are received, and reduces leisure:
Ls[E11.. .,ER]
(4.b) iR > 0;
>0, Vt>RER -new
P falls to zero Vt 3 Bt orig new
Each of the first two effects raises utility, while each of the
latter two lowers it. Hence, whether working additional years
raises or lowers utility depends on the parameters of the
particular individual's utility function and income opportunities.
Utility is maximized when no possible change in years worked
produces gains in earnings and in pension per year worth more
than the loss of years of pension benefits and of leisure
years.
—6--
C. Conclusions
Life cycle theory specifies that labor supply and retirement
status in any period depend upon earnings and pensions in
all periods. In Section II we shall consider how individual
confronting different earnings and pension streams would be
expected to differ with respect to retirement behavior, and
in Section III, review empirical evidence on these effects.
—7—
II. Theoretical Specifications in the Literature
The theoretical literature addressing various aspects
of pensions, earnings, retirement, and life cycle labor supply
is voluminous. However, a much more limited number of studies
considers-how pensions and earnings affect retirement decisions
and life cycle labor supply. In this section, we review the
available literature on the effects of pensions and earnings
on retirement. These studies, in order are: Feldstein;
Kotlikoff; Pellechio; Boskin and Hurd; Burtless and Hausman;
Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton; Burkhauser and Quinn; Reimers;
Sarnmartino; Gordon and Blinder; Hemming; Fields and Mitchell;
Sheshinski; Burbidge and Robb; MacDonald and Carliner; Gotz
and McCall; Crawford and Lilien; Gustman and Steinmeier; and
Clark and Joinson) A brief outline of the structure of each
model comes next, followed by a comparison of their similarities
and differences and then by a statement of the comparative
dynamic results that emerge.
1Five lines of research also appear in the literature which,
though tangentially related to the effects of pensions and
earnings on retirement, do not deal directly with this question.
We mention them here so that the reader may understand that
these literatures do not offer guidance on the question at
hand. Many of these studies are surveyed in Campbell and
Campbell; Clark, Kreps, and Spengler; and Clark and Spengler.
Besides the models reviewed belDw, there are other theore-
tical life cycle models. These others address choices of
education, work, and leisure over the life cycle. Among the
most fully—developed of these analyses are the works of Ben
Porath, Ghez and Becker, Heckman, and Ryder, Stafford and
Stephan. These studies explicitly analyze individual workers'
lifetime decisions, paying particular attention to the inter—
dependencies between past, current, and future alternatives
and constraints which shape people's actions. However, because
these studies are directed toward understanding individuals'
decisions to invest in education and training, they do not
analyze the retirement decision in any serious way. In particular,
Ben Porath assumes away retirement by adopting an infinite
—continued next page-
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1 continued
time horizon, while the other authors assume the worker never
retires. These models should not be faulted for failing to
do well something for which they were not designed.
A second set of models considers retirement decisions in
a life cycle context but does not pay serious attention to
the structures of pensions and Social Security as determinants
of retirement behavior. Examples in the economics literature
are the works of Weiss, Blinder and Weiss, Driffill, Lazear (1979),
and Cotterman. Outside of economics, other social scientists,
particularly sociologists, have conceptualized retirement
in a life course perspective; see for instance Abeles and Riley.
A third group has provided a detailed examination of the
budget set facing older workers, taking due account of kinks,
discontinuities, and other features of pension and earnings
opportunities. This is not done, however, in a life cycle
context. Examples are Boskin, Bulow, and Honlg and Hanoch.
A fourth group of models looks at pensions but does not
focus on retirement decisions. Examples are some of Feldstein's
works on the effects of Social Security and private pensions
on savings, Smith's and Schiller and Weiss' (1980) investigations
of the economics of underfunded pensions in terms of compensating
differentials; studies by Munnell, and Clark and McDermed on
the effect of inflation on pensions; and the works of many on
the adequacy of retirement income (see Clark, Kreps, and Spengler;
Robertson or Schulz for reviews of these literatures). The
Pensions Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research has
produced several studies on pension fund assets (see for instance
the references in Tepper) and pensions as they relate to compen-
sation packages (see for example Eatcn and Rosen, Mitchell, and
Taubman). Since these studies do not consider explicitly the
employment and retirement decisions of older workers, we do
not incorporate them into our present review of the literature.
A fifth literature looks at the optimal design of retire-
inent systems. Examples are the studies by Diamond and Mirrlees,
Hu, and Hagens on the Social Security system. These studies
address general equilibrium aspects of Social Security and
private pensions, often in a sophisticated way; but the retire—
ment decision process embodied in these models is not very
informative. (Diamond and Nirrlees' model, for example produces
the result (p. 324) that ". . . the consumer is indifferent
about his date of retirement.") On the other hand, studies
like those of the President's Commission on Pension Policy are
realistic institutionally but lack a formal analytical structure
for characterizing and designing optimal retirement systems.
A Worthwhile direction for future research would be to integrate
the general equilibrium models or Social Security from the
public economics literature with the life cycle models of
retirement from the labor economics literature, using realistic
assumptions about Social Security and private pensions Such
analyses await future study.
—9—
A. The Structure of Existing Models
Feldstein's studies of the Social Security system set off
the recent surge of interest in the economics of pensions. By
means of simple examples in a two period earnings and con-
sumption model, he showed that some individuals' total lifetime
work effort might be invariant to Social Security while Social
Security might cause others (those who might have otherwise
gone on working after 65) to retire earlier. For the first group
of individuals, public saving would substitute for private
saving leaving total labor supply unaffected, while for the
second, Social Security "acts as a combination of an annual
lump sum grant and a tax on earnings after the standard retire-
ment age. The result is to reduce the labor supply of pension
recipients, generally through earlier retirement.* (p.908)
Proceeding to aggregative analysis, Feldstein introduced the
notion of a Social Security Wealth (SSW) variable, defined as
the total value of normal retirement benefits obligated by the
Social Security system, ignoring contributions. Retirement
benefits available to workers at ages other than the normal
retirement age were not considered. Feldstein used this variable
in a Modigliani-type macro consumption function and found that
SSW reduced aggregate savings by a substantial percentage.
It remained for his students, Kotlikoff and Pellechio, to extend
the SSW notion in more micro directions.
Kotlikoff's paper recognizes that Social Security wealth
can also be defined for dates other than the normal retirement
age, and concludes that "Social Security may induce early
retirement due to an implicit tax on post-62 earnings."
—10—
Beyond this, Kotlikoff's main contribution is empirical (see
Section III below).
Pellechio's theoretical approach, like Kotlikoff's,
derives from Feldstein's notion of Social Security wealth,
but takes the notion one step further theoretically by linking
it with a microeconomic labor supply model. Following upon
recent analyses by Gronau, Heckman, Hall, and others, Pellechio
(1978) posits two equations:
Market wage equation: Zn W = Xc + e1
Reservation wage equation: Zn S = Y + yI< + e2,
where X and Y are vectors of determinants of market wages and
reservation wages respectively, K is the amount of work time,
and e1 and e2 are error terms. Different individuals supply
different amounts of labor according to their particular values
of X and Y. If it is assumed that the individual chooses to
work when the market wage exceeds the reservation wage, this
would be a standard single'-period labor supply model. To try
to make it a life cycle labor supply model, Pellechio includes
a variable for Social Security wealth (SSW) defined for one
particular age. Adding this variable to the market and reser-
vation wage equations above yields Y3 + e2<SSSW + Xcx + e1 as
the participation condition, or P(participate) = P(e2—e1<6SSW
+ Xa — Ye). By further specifying the form of the errors e1
and e2 and with additional derivations Pellechio arrives at an
econometric specification of the retirement probability as a
function of a number of wage determining and reservation—wage—
determining variables plus a single value of SSW. Note, however,
that this rendering of older persons' labor supply decision
—11—
takes no account of alternative earnings or retirement
income streams available at different retirement ages.
In a more recent paper (1981), Pellechio extends the simple
model described above in three directions. To the reservation
wage equation, he adds a measure of Social Security payroll taxes
the worker contributes over his worklife, thus taking into
account a variable ignored in previous studies. In the market
wage function, he includes a measure of the Social Security
benefits a worker would forego if he postponed retirement
by one year. He also incorporates the gain in future SSW
obtained by postponing retirement by one year. In so doing,
the model is extended to take into account several institu-
tionally relevant features of the Social Security system that
had been excluded in his earlier stud'r. Nonetheless this more
recent study still does not recognize the role of private
pension and earnings streams at all possible retirement dates,
and limits its attention to Social Security benefit increases
obtained for only one more year of work. Thus it captures
more but not all of the relevant economic variables determining
the retirement decision.
Boskin, Boskin and Hurd, and Hurd and Boskin. These
papers are motivated more by empirical concerns than by
theoretical ones. In the paper by Boskin alone., a life cycle
model is presented, but it is an appendix disjoint from the
body of the paper. The appendix sets up the individual as
maximizing the present discounted value of utility, where
the arguments of the utility function are additively separable
and the instantaneous utility function depends on consumption
—12—
of goods, X, and leisure, L:
T
f u(x,L)dt
t=o
The constraint is K = rK + W(t) (T—K(t)) — P(t)X(t), where K
is assets, K saving, and W(t) and P(t) are the after—tax wage
rate and price of consumption goods. T denotes two different
things: the number of periods in the objective function, and
the number of hours per period in the constraint equation. Note
the absence of both Social Security and private pensions from
this budget constraint. Hence, this is a life cycle model
without pensions. The model in Boskin's text, on the other
hand, while considering the real-world Social Security benefit
structure, completely ignores life cycle features. Using
Figures la—ld, Boskin shows that some individuals are unaffected
by Social Security: those in Figure la work despite being
eligible for Social Security while those in Figure lb retire
completely and would do so even in the absence of Social
Security. But for other individuals, Social Security does
affect retirement, inducing full retirement in Figure ic
and partial retirement in Figure ld. This model, unlike most,
allows for partial work rather than assuming an all—or—nothing
choice, but the life cycle feature is absent. The same single
period model is used in the subsequent paper by Boskin and Hurd.
The third paper is primarily empirical and is reviewed below.
Similar approaches (using a single-period model to analyze
a trichotomous dependent variable) were used by Burtless and
Hausman and by Zabaiza, Pissarides, and Barton. Burtless and
Hausman's sample consisted of U.S Government employes; their
Income
Income
•T. _.t Ui-
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dependent variable was whether at a subsequent date, the
individual was still working for the government, working the
private sector, or unemployed. Zabaiza, Pissarides, and Barton
studied the choice between full-time work, part-time work, and
retirement for a sample of older persons in the U.K. Theore-
tically, posing retirement as a discrete data problem is an
interesting idea. Life cycle aspects have been integrated
into the theory of discrete choice by Gustman and Steinmeler;
see below.
Burkhauser, and Burkhauser and Quinn. Burkhauser's
theoretical model (1976) was the first life cycle model of
retirement that took real world pension structures into account.
It was explicitly formulated in reaction to the absence of life
cycle considerations in earlier models. In Burkhauser's
worLd (1979, P. 64): "In contrast to the approach of previous
investigators (Boskin, Quinn), it is not simply the size of the
annual pension payments, but the present value of the pension,
that emerges as theoretically important." By considering the
gain (or loss) in pension value if one takes early retirement
rather than waiting until the normal retirement age, Burkhauser
captures one important component of life cycle models. His
theoretical discussion indicates his awareness of other rele-
vant life cycle factors (1979, pp. 64—5):
If the acceptance of a pension were not related to
leaving one's job, the timing of its acceptance would
be unambiguous. Given a choice among different yearly
payments (Be) based on age (s) when accepting a pension,
a worker would accept a pension at the age that yielded
a stream with the greatest present value (A(s) 1 - Ac-
cepting a pension usually requires leaving the job, which
suggests that loss of wages and fringe benefits must be
taken into account.... Earnings from the job in each
period (wjtj), where Wj is his wage rate (including fringe
benefits) and tj is time spent on the job, are considered
totally lost to the worker taking the early pension.
—15—
In the specific formulations of his theoretical relation-
ships (his equations 2 and 3), he has the individual evaluating
only two possibilities (retirement at present versus retirement
at 65) rather than the whole range of alternatives (the possi-
bility of retiring sometime between the present and 65). Also,
his 1979 study makes no mention of the gain or loss in Social
Security benefits if retirement is postponed. Nonetheless,
Burkhauser's theoretical model represents a substantial advance
in modeling the effects of pensions on retirement. As noted
below in Section III, his empirical studies are also among the
better of the applied studies.
In two more recent papers, Burkhauser develops his theore-
tical and empirical arguments further. Burkhauser (1980) focuses
on the asset value of Social Security benefits and suggests
that this measure, because it is life cycle based, is more
appropriate than a comparison of one year's pension benefits with
that year's earnings. Burkhauser and Quinn (1980) treat
private pension and Social Security together and consider their
asset value, A(s), along with wages, w(s), in an indirect utility
function:
ii = f(w(s), A(s)).
The individual's goal is to choose that work path which
maximizes . This specification highlights Burkhauser and
Quinn's fundamental point that ". . . the trade—off between
potential wages and potential changes in the asset value of
the .pension is the crucial financial factor in the decision
to separate from a job." (p. 41) While we agree with this
point, what is missing from this analysis is an explicit
—16—
specification of the form of the indirect utility function
and of the tradeoffs implicit in the budget contraint.
Other authors have made considerable headway on this problem.
Their contributions are reviewed below.
Reimers' work in 1977 came after Burkhauser completed his
dissertation (1976) but before the publication of his first
article (1979). Her chapter on the theory of retirement builds
on Burkhauser's analysis but adopts a fuller life cycle frame—
work. She notes, quite correctly, that it is necessary to
compare retirement at present with all possible retirement
ages, not just 65 alone as Burkhauser had done. In the most
general version of her model, the individual's problem is to
choose an optimal hours path as a function of present and
future wages, present and future job opportunities, and
present and future pensions. Retirement by her definition
occurs when the individual leaves the primary employer and
accepts a pension. The optimal age of retirement is solved
using optimal control techniques.
In Reimers' model, the retirement decision is made as
follows. If the individual works one more year, the change
in well-being (Z) associated with a unit change in ace of
retirement (a) is:
3Z 1 , —ra
—
—— [(W — W )T — P (a) — S (afle
a 11(a) am am am a a
+ 1D 1 Pt(a) etdt + fD 1 St(a) etdt
a 11(a) a a 1(a) 3a
1 it
—
—Z(a)11(a) a
where Warn = wage a man would receive from main employer if
he retires at age a;
—17—
WI = wage a man would receive from next bestam
employer if he retires from main employer at
age a;
T = time worked
am
P(a) = private pension in year a if he retires in year
a;
Sa(a) = Social Security pension in year a if he retires
in year a;
Pt(a) = private pension in year t if he retires in year a;
St(a) = Social Security rension in year t if he retires
in year a;
D = date of death;
¶(a) = unit cost of commodities produced in year a, which
subsumes hours decisions and shadow price of time.
Neglecting the yr's, this equation has a clear interpretation.
The term in brackets on the right hand side is the extra earnings
(hourly wage multiplied by time worked) if one works another
year, less the private pension and Social Security benefit fore-
gone in that year. The first integral represents the change
in present value of private pension benefits if retirement is
postponed one year, while the second is the corresponding figure
for Social Security. The last term is the change in the cost
of commodities. The ¶(a) terms impose utility values on each
of these incomes taking account of the work needed to produce
them. To sum up this expression for retirement behavior, the
individual is assumed to balance the gain (or loss) in ut1ity
from more income but less leisure now, against the gain in
utility from more income from private pensions and Social
—18—
Security later if retirement is postponed. The first order
condition specifies that he retires when the two are equal,
i.e., — = 0.
Reimers' model comes close to deriving the behavior
of interest to us, namely, the effects of changes in wages
and changes in pensions (both public and private) on work
hours and retirement. Her formulation differs from what we
would want in two respects: she assumes wages are constant,
when we would have the individual considering how wages would
change if retirement is postponed;1 and in the specific solution
she actually displays, the optimal work/leisure path is derived
implicitly but is never stated explicitly or characterized.
Sammartjno (1978) constructed a model whicth, like Reimers',
adopts an optimal control framework. The individual must
decide how to spend his time now and in the future in order to
maximize the present discounted value of goods (X) and leisure
CL):
r
The decision-maker begins with an initial stock of assets.
If he works in a period, he receives an income which adds to
his stock of assets. When he doesn't work, he receives the
Utility from leisure. Sammartino uses optimal control to derive
the utility—maximizing path. In the absence of a pension, his
equation 13' gives the change in leisure along this optimal
path as:
00 w Cq-r)tL = (q - r + e W/ULLI
1Some life cycle models in fact place wage change at the core of
the explanation for why people retire.
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where L is the change in leisure, q is the individual's discount
rate, r is the rate of return on assets, w/w is the rate of
growth of wages, A0 is the implicit value of a marginal dollar
of initial wealth, and ULL is the second derivative of utility
with respect to leisure (assumed negative). If the first term
0
in parentheses (q-r + w/w) is negative, leisure will increase
over time (i.e., L > 0). If the increase is sufficiently rapid,
the individual reaches the point of full leisure, hence
zero work. Thus, if retirement is defined as zero work, an
individual is more likely to retire the greater is the difference
between the market rate of interest Cr) and the individual's
subjective discount rate (q) relative to his rate of wage
growth (w/w).
Thus far, the model does not build in pensions explicitly.
Once a pension is allowed for, and receipt of pension benefits
is conditioned on ceasing to work for the principal employer,
the system becomes much more complicated. Sammartino sets up
but does not solve for the optimum in this expanded system.
He notes that the age of retirement depends on the pre and post
retirement wages, the level of pension benefits, the change in
pension benefits from the delaying reitrement, the interest
rate, the discount rate, and the otpimal amount of work time
in both the pre and post retirement periods. However, this
paper does not develop the comparative dynamics implicit in the
model.1 -
= -
-
Gordon and Blinder's paper represents a careful attempt
'A second paper by Sammartino (1980) is more explicitly em-
pirical and is reviewed in Section III, below.
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to tie together a full-fledged life cycle model of retirement
with an institutionally realistic pension structure. An
accompanying paper (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise) addresses
institutional aspects of Social Security and consequent effects
on work incentives in greater detail.
Their retirement model has three periods: the past
(period 0), the present (period 1), and the future (period
2). Individuals of different ages have pasts and futures
of different lengths (T0 and T2 years respectively). The
individual's problem is to decide how much work to do at
present (L1) and how much to do in the future (L2), taking the
past as given. Denoting the utility from consumption in a
period by U(C) and the utility of leisure in a period by
V(L.), the decision-maker seeks that combination of work
and consumption which maximizes the following utility function:
J = T0U(C0) + V(L0)} + U(C1) + V(L1) + T2'2) + V(L7)1 + p1 (l+p1) (l+p2)
Retirement occurs when, following Gordon and Blinder's def i—
nition, the number of hours worked for pay goes to zero.
What role do they give to pensions in affecting retirement?
The way they think about it is that workers accrue pension
rights while working and these accruals are considered to be
wages at the time of the accrual. Workers, however, do not
necessarily value the pension contributions as they do money
wages. They define a parameter, lambda, which indicates the
subjective weight given by workers to pension contributions
relative to money wages. This formulation obligates them to
maintain a direct link between pension contributions and pension
benefits based on an (empirically) unobserved weighting factor.
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It would seem better as a general proposition to drop that
link and to treat direct correspondence between pension benefits
and pension contributions as a special case.
This three-period model, with the future being treated
as a single period, does not by its very nature afford examination
of allocation of time within the future. That being the case,
it is very hard to imagine why an optimal solution would be
to work now and not work in the future, since that would be
a sharply discontinuous result in a model with no apparent
discontinuities. In fact, the authors have discontinuities within
the future in mind: deterioration in health, falling wages,
and changing preferences in favor of leisure. But these do
not enter exulicitly into their theoretical model.
Hemming proposes a more general life cycle model of
retirement, where the individual selects a retirement date (Ri)
to produce the largest income flow over his lifetime.
The individual is assumed to work full time up to the age of
retirement and not to work thereafter; no part—time employment
is allowed for. Income streams depend explicitly on the
worker's choice of retirement date, since they are composed
of earnings until the date of retirement, private pension
income thereafter, and public pension benefits from some
institutionally set age until death. The private pension
benefit stream is structured to depend directly on the worker's
retirement date, which is an essential feature of real-world
pension systems. However, it is assumed that the public
pension always pays a flat amount (p). In eauation form, the
model assumes that the worker maximizes, by choice of
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the following:
Y(R1) = (l-)w(t)dt + (R1)dt + pdt
where:
(l-c)w(t) is the net wage in year t
y(R1) is the private pension amount received per year if
the retirement date of is chosen
L is length of life
R2 is the date public pension benefits begin
Y(R1) is the present value of future income streams
(discounting is ignored for expository convenience).
One of the most important contributions of this study is
that it explicitly recognizes that the life-cycle model requires
the worker to compare the gains in pension income from a
longer work life against the loss in earnings from retiring
earlier. The first order condition is stated clearly: "at
the margin, the increase in the present value of net wage
income plus pension benefits after retirement from postponing
retirement. . .must equal the present value of the pension
income foregone through later retirement." (p. 170). An
implicit function for the optimal retirement date is derived,
and impliáations of changes in pension parameters noted.
For instance: an increase in the flat benefit provided by the
public pension always induces earlier retirement because
retirement is made more lucrative than work. An increase in
the tax ratE' on earnings Ccx) is found to produce postponed
retirement. However a change in y has theoretically ambiguous
effects on the optimal retirement date, depending on other
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parameters in the model. Another novel feature of the study
is that the pension is not necessarily actuarially neutral.
Hemming assumes an income—maximization framework, which is
advantageous theoretically in focusing attention on the role
of pensions and earnings in determining retirement but un-
realistic empirically. A more serious limitation is that the
functional forms used by Hemming to characterize public and
private pension plans are too simplistic and need to be made
more realistic.
Fields and Mitchell (1981) also model how an income—
maximizer chooses the optimal age—of-retirement when each
period's work hours are given. That paper showed that a
necessary and sufficient condition for an income maximizer
ever to retL.-e is that the annual pension benefit must cut the
net earnings function from below. If this condition holds and
if earnings and pension benefit per year are both linear functions
of time, E = m + nt and iT = p + qt respectively, then the
income—maximizing age-of-retirement is given by R* = mp+qT
This optimum is found by balancing off the gain in earnings
and in pension benefits from working one more year against
the loss of one year's pension benefits. We refer to this as
the "life cycle rule." Other decision rules are shown to
lead to retirement ages that differ systematically from the
optimum, as shown in Figure 2:
(1T
Age—of-retirement
Rule Rule Rule RTLExpected3 2 4 Lifetime
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where:
V(R) is present discounted value of lifetime income;
Rule 1: Retire at the age when the last year's
earnings are just offset by the loss in present
discounted value of pension benefits by post-
poning retirement one more year.
Rule 2: Retire when the current year's pension equals
the current year's earnings.
Rule 3: Retire when pension wealth (PDVP) is maximized.
Rule 4: Retire when the replacement rate (the ratio of
pension benefits to pre—retirement earnings)
is maximized.
The retirement ages using Rules 2 and 3 are definitely, less
than the optimum for an income—maximizer and the retirement
age using Rule 4 is too late; but where the ages using Rules
2 and 3 are relative to one another depends on specific
parameters. Additionally, comparative dynamics were considered
for the income maximizer. It was shown that although conven-
tional wisdom usually holds that higher pensions lead to
earlier retirement and higher wages to later retirement, the
reverse results are also possible; examples were presented to
show that some pension increases may result in earlier
retirement and some wage increases may result. in later retire-
ment. These possibilities are also noted by Burbidge and Robb
and by Sheshinski in studies reviewed below.
Sheshinski presents a thorough analysis of the problem
confronting a utility-maximizer who values both consumption
and leisure and whose control variable is the number of
periods worked before retiring. He first analyzes a highly
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stylized model at length and then generalizes it in more
realistic ways though in less detail. Both models contain
a rigorous development of the life cycle framework and the
decision rule it implies: To paraphrase the rule, the
individual assesses the direct loss in utility from further
postponement of retirement, weighs this loss against the
utility value of the gain in present value of earnings and
pension receipts, and chooses as his optimum the point at
which these gains and losses are equal. Another result of
interest emerges from his more general model: that the effects
of higher wages and higher pensions on the age of retirement
are ambiguous depending on the parameters of the respective
functions. Sheshinski deserves credit as the first to develop
these ambiguities rigorously. Despite these strengths, his
conclusions are limited in generality owing to his assumption
of actuarial neutrality of pensions, which is unrealistic in
most circumstances.
Burbidge and Robb offer a more realistic analysis, in
that they do not require actuarial neutrality. Their basic
framework is illustrated in Figure 3 for an individual whose
utility function gives positive weight to consumption and
time in retirement. Let FM be the individual's lifetime budget
constraint-with no pension under alternative retirement
dates (measured from right to left——time spent in retirement
is measured from left to right). A representative indifference
curve is drawn as PQ in Figure 3a; an individual with budget
constraint FM and preference mapping PW would retire at a*
years of leisure. Introducing a pension plan shifts the life—
time budget constraint. How it shifts depends on the balance
3a. Choice of Retire—
ment Age
3b-d. Introduction oftiiLLLW. LL Vt tL1 LUll
Plans
Figure 3
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between pension benefits and pension contributions at each age.
Three possibilities are illustrated in Figures 3b—3d.
The remainder of Burbidge and Robb's analysis consists of
analyzing the consequences of these different pension structures
for the age of retirement.
Another paper that pursues a similar approach is that of
MacDonald and Carliner. They too work in a framework assuming
Utility-maximizing that hours of work are fixed within each
period. The authors examine how the optimal retirement date
varies as pension and other parameters change (assuming interior
solutions). Of particular interest is their formulation of
a specific pension function, which is nonlinearly related to
the age of retirement. Some unexpected resulté are apparently
peculiar to their specific pension function; for instance they
find that inclusion of fewer years of salary in the pension
base calculation induces earlier retirement, and increases in
the penalty for early retirement probably induce earlier
retirement.
Gotz an McCall have sketched a similar way of analyzing
the life cycle retirement problem, but focus heavily on sources
of behavioral differences across people. Their primary interest
is in deterrrining retention rates of military personnel, and
in particular in evaluating how the military retirement system
affects an officer's choice of retirement dates. The individual
is posited to compare the extra earnings and higher pension
produced by one more year of work, against the lost benefits
foregone by not retiring immediately. In addition the authors
acknowledge that nonmonetary factors may play an important
role, and devote a great deal of attention to modeling these
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other factors, which enter via an individual specific utility
function (that varies across people))- They also relax the
assumption of perfect certainty, so that both economic factors
and random variation are allowed to determine the optimal
retirement date. Much of this work is still in progress, so
that the final form of the theoretical equation is not yet
clear, but their approach appears to be one of the more
sophisticated analyses of a life cycle retirement problem. On
the other hand, the model has not yet incorporated many specific
institutional features of military pensions and the Social
Security system, and how these interact to determine retirement.
Crawford and Lilien approach the retirement question in
a somewhat different but systematic manner. They begin with
a highly-stylized model (which has its origins in the work of
Feldstein and Burbidge and Robb) that assumes that pensions
are actuarially neutral, capital markets are perfect, and length
of life is known with certainty. In this "base case" model
pensions have no effect on retirenieni:; the individual merely
substitutes savings through the pension fund for savings he
would have done on his own, borrowing or lending in the capital
market to achieve the desired timing of consumption and savings
over the life cycle. Crawford and Lilien then relax the perfect
capital market assumption, and find that higher required pension
contribution levels produce earlier retirement. This is
explained by the declining marginal utility of consumption at.
higher income levels, and the tendency to use some of these
'Two papers, one by Burtless and Hausrnan, the other by Zabaiza,
Pissarides and Barton, also allow for differences in preferences
across individuals. Neither utilizes a life cycle framework
in their retirement model, however.
forced savings to purchase additional leisure. In a model
where the individual can only adjust the number of periods
worked, and not hours within a period, the worker will retire
earlier. Deviations from pension neutrality are also examined
in some detail: for example, current Social Security rules
apparently create an incentive to move retirement toward age
65, at least among those who would have retired later in the
absence of Social Security. Finally, these authors also
examine the effect of an actuarially neutral pension scheme
in a world with uncertain lifetimes, concluding that the
insurance feature of Social Security creates an income effect
toward early retirement, and an ambiguous substitution effect
(assuming that private insurance schemes are not available).
The authors have not yet combined all three features (imperfect
capital markets, uncertain lifetimes, and non—neutral
pensions) into a single model. This extension awaits further
research.
Finally, two new theoretical directions in the literature
bear mention. Gustman and Steinmejer set up a variable-hours
life cycle model for a utility-maximizer. The novel feature
of their work is to include the wage in an alternate job as an
additional explanatory factor and the hours worked in the
alternate job as an additional control variable. They do not
yet have an analytical solution to their model. Another
novelty is thund in the work of Clark and Johnson, whose point
of departure is to introduce a family context. (All other
researchers considered a single individual's problem.) Like
Gustman and Steinmeier, they have a variable—hours life cycle
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model of a utility-maximizer; and, they too have been unable
to obtain an analytical solution.
B. Comparing the Structures
1. The Control Instrument
Most models of pensions and retirement assume that older
workers must choose between full—time work and zero work.
These so-called "age—of—retirement models" are useful since
they are capable of capturing many of the interesting life
cycle aspects of income opportunities and consequent work
patterns. Five theoretical models have gone beyond this age—
of-retirement specification to consider part—time work and
variable hours models. Sammartjno (1978) and Clark and
Johnson discuss the hours decision explicitly in a life cycle
context; Reimers considers the hours decision implicitly
inwhat is otherwise an
age-of—retirement model; Boskin and
Hurd evaluate semi—retirement as an option to full retirement,
but do not take a life cycle approach; and Gustman and Stein—
meier allow for variable hours on the main job and on an
alternate job. Unfortunately, their theoretical models are
not yet very informative on the factors making one hours path
more likely than another, for the following reasons. Sainmartino
assumes that hours of work decline smoothly to zero, Reimers
does not display the hours path at all, Boskin and Hurd do not
examine changes in hours over time, and Gustman and Steinmeier
and Clark and Johnson were unable to solve analytically the
optimal control model they had set up. More research is needed
on the forces leading alternatively to discrete switches from
full—time work to zero work, from full—time work to part—time,
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or to smoothly declining hours paths.
2. The Objective Function
a. Multiperiod or Not? Since retirement and life-
time labor supply are life cycle decisions, they must be
modeled in a multiperiod framework. The earliest models
did not do this; they were limited to one period only.
Burkhauser (in his dissertation) presented the first genuine
life cycle model of retirement. His contribution to the
literature was to demonstrate that the decision of when to
retire depends on the present discounted value (PDV) of
alternative pension streams. However, he unduly restricted
the choice set by considering only the value of retiring today
as opposed to retiring at the age of compulsory retirement.
A life cycle approach suggests that someone facing mandatory
retirement should also consider whether it might be even
better to retire at some intermediate age; workers not subject
to mandatory retirement should also examine the advantages
of deferred retirement at all possible ages. All life cycle
models after Burkhauser's have recognized that an anlysis of
retirement options should consider all possible retirement dates.
b. Does the Utility Function Value Leisure? Some
authors (Hemming, Fields and Mitchell) consider income-
maximization models, thereby assuming the indivudal places no
value on leisure.' Income-maximization models highlight the
effects of the budget constraint (pensions and earnings) on
'Models in which people are assumed to maximize Social Security
wealth or private pension assets also leave aside the utility
value of leisure.
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retirement. And, as Hemming notes (p. 171): "Although it
is fairly straightforward to incorporate leisure in the model
it can be shown that it does not affect the qualitative nature
of the results." Most models, however, explicitly introduce
leisure as well as income (or consumption) as argument in the
utility function.
c. How Does Leisure Enter the Utility Function?
The most general approach is to express utility as a
function of each period's consumption and leisure, as we did
earlier: U = Further specification is often helpful.
The most common one is to impose intertemporal separability:
U =
U(Ct,Lt); U1>O, U11<O, U2>O, U22<O. Sometimes, within—
period separability appears: U = 41(Lt); '> 0, q"< 0,
p'> 0, p"< 0. The previous specifications are particularly
well—suited to variable hours models. However, in age—of—
retirement models, a lifetime utility function is sometimes
used instead: U = U(PDVY, RET), U1> 0, U1< 0, U2> 0, U< 0,
where PDVY is the present discounted value of lifetime income
or consumption and RET is the length of the retirement
period. In the age-of—retirement models, where additional
leisure can only be obtained by working fewer periods, a
lifetime utility function, unlike the others, allows for
diminishing marginal utility of leisure across periods. For
this reason, we regard the lifetime utility function as the
most appropriate in an age-of-retirement context.
3. The Budget Constraint
The life cycle model presentedinSection I maintained
that the steams of several economic variables are essential
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to determining the budget constraint. They are: the earnings
stream (net of taxes), the (net) private pension and Social
Security benefits that could be received at different ages,
the contributions to private pensions and Social Security,
and (where relevant) the wage that could be earned on an
alternate job. No theoretical study in the literature has
done this.
Two problems stand out. First, some models consider
Only the current values of economic variables,
overlooking
their streams over time. This is less frequently a problem
in the theoretical literature than it is in the empirical
literature reviewed below, where streams of explanatory
variables rarely appear.
Second, theoretical studies vary in the way they in—
corporate pensions in the budget constraint. Some require
actuarial neutrality of pensions while others do not impose
a dollar-for.-.dollar linkage between benefits and contributions;
we prefer the latter, both for its theoretical generality and
for its institutional realism. Another issue is whether models
allow pension benefits per year to rise if the individual
retires later. Most models have this feature but reservation
wage models do not. Once again, theoretical generality and
institutional realism argue in favor of such a specification.
A final feature, the fact that most individuals are eligible
to receive pension benefits only after retiring, has been
included in most theoretical models.
4. The Decision Rule
The rules characterizing the optimal age of retirement
are derived in most moddls by maximizing the objective function
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subject to a budget constraint and the available instruments.
This is as it should be. Some models, however, use ad hoc
rules instead. For example, the asset—maximization decision
rule holds that the optimal retirement date is that which
maximizes the asset value of pension benefits. Other criteria
for determining the optimal age of retirement are even less
appropriate. Two such rules are: "Retire when the replacement
rate is maximized" and "Retire when pension benefit comes to
equal earnings." These alternate rules are not derived directly
from maximization of the objective function, and Fields
and Mitchell (1981) show they err systematically.
c. Results of the Models: How Pensions and Earnings
1Affect Retirement.
It is often assumed that higher wages lead to later
retirement and higher pension benefits (from Social Security
or private pensions) to earlier retirement. This presumption
has been challenged and shown to not necessarily be true at
three levels:
1. The "Base Case World." [Feldstein, Bur.bidge and
Robb, Crawford and Lilien]. If pensions are actuarially neutral,
capital markets perfect, and lifetimes known with certainty,
the pension system leaves the budget constraint unchanged and
hence does not affect the individual's choices of lifetime
consumption and leisure and the corresponding amount of lifetime
work.
'These comparative dynamic predictions are for an age-of-retirement
framework where the individual either works full time or else
withdraws from market work altogether. Models which allow part-
time work have not yielded meaningful comparative dyanmic results.
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2. The Income-Maximizer. [Hemming, Fields and Mitchell]
The income maximizer does not value leisure. Consequently,
a change in pension or earnings has no income effect, only
substitution effects. Several theoretical predictions on
comparative dynamics are available for the income maximizer:1
(a) If pension benefits are increased exogenously, by
a constant number of dollars for each possible
retirement age, then the retirement alternative
becomes more attractive and the individual is
induced to retire earlier. This is an ordinary
substitution effect in response to changes in the
level of pension benefits.
(b) If pension benefits are increased exogenously, by
a non—uniform number of dollars for each possible
retirement age, two substitution effects obtain.
The ordinary substitution effect favors retirement.
In addition, an intertemporal substitution effect
arises since the individual now has a different
amount to gain if he postpones retirement. If,
for instance, pension benefits increased by a
constant percentage at each age, the intertemporal
substitution effect would encourage delayed retire—
irtent, because more is to be gained by retiring later.
In opposition, the ordinary substitution effect en-
courages earlier retirement. On net, the effect
of such a tilt in the benefit formula may lead
to earlier or later retirement, depending on which
effect dominates. Thus pension benefit increases
2of this form have an ambiguous impact on retirement.
Cc) An exogenous increase in earnings ceteris paribus
raises the opportunity cost of retiring. Therefore,
the income-maximizing individual would substitute
in favor of the (relatively higher) net earnings
stream and away from the pension stream, implying
that he is more likely to retire later.
Cd) An exogenous drop in pension contributions, ceteris
paribus, has the identical effect as in (c), and
produces a substitution response favoring later
retirement.
1Thecomnparative dynamics reported here apply to workers who
do plan to retire during their lifetime; individuals who plan
never to work or never to retire may not respond to marginal
changes in earnings or pensions.
2Specific examples illustrating these points are presented in
Fields and Mitchell (1981).
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(e) The higher is the wage in a post-retirement job,
the greater is the value of leaving the principal
employer. Defining retirement as the date of
leaving the principal employer and accepting a
pension, an income-maximizer is more likely to
retire earlier.,1
3. The Utility-Maximizer [Sheshinki, Burbidge and Robb,
Crawford and Lilien, Fields and Mitchell, MacDonald and Carliner].
For the case of a utility maximizer, satisfaction is derived
from the leisure as well as income. In this case, when the
earnings stream and/or pension stream changes, income effects
arise in addition to the substitution effects, producing even
fewer unambiguous conclusions.
(a) If pension benefits increase for every retirement
age by a constant number of dollars, then ceteris
paribus, both ordinary substitution and income
effects are present. By the substitution effect,
retirement is now more attractive, so the individual
tends to retire earlier. By the income effect, full
lifetime wealth is now higher and the individual
tends to buy more of normal goods; if leisure is
a normal good, he would buy more by working fewer
periods. Thus both the substitution and income
effects work in the same direction; a utility
maximizer would tend to retire earlier in response
to an increase in his pension benefits by a fixed
number of dollars per year.
(b) If pension benefits are increased by a non-uniform
amount, in addition to the effects cited for the
income—maximizer in (2.b), an income effect is now
also present. The pension increase raises his
wealth, and the income effect leads him to retire
earlier. This tends to reinforce the ordinary
substitution effect, which also favors earlier
retirement. But because the intertemporal substitution
effect may be positive and large, the effect of a
non—uniform pension increase on the age of retirement
is still ambiguous for a utility—maximizer.
(c) If earnings are increased £xogenously, two offsetting
effects obtain for a utility-maximizer. As in the
case of the income maximizer, there is a substitution
'An income—maximizer would never stop working if he could
simultaneously receive a pension from his principal employer
and earn a positive net• wage in a post—retirement job.
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effect: because the payoff to working is greater,
the substitution effect facors later retirement.
However, the utility-maximizer also has an income
effect: after working the first period, the
individual's wealth is greater, and the income
effect tends to make the individual increase con-
sumption of leisure and retire earlier. Thus, in
general, for a utility—maximizer, the effect of
increased earnings on retirement is theoretically
ambiguous. This ambiguity has not been recognized
by others who have looked at the comparative dynamics
of this problem.
(d) An exogenous drop in pension contributions, ceteris
paribus, is also theoretically ambiguous for the same
reasons as in (c) : the substitution effect favors
later retirement and the income effect favors earlier
retirement.
(e) The higher are earnings on a post—retirement job,
the greater are the opportunity costs of remaining
with the principal employer and of leaving the labor
force completely. The incentives are therefore to
accept a pension from the principal employer earlier,
hastening retirement by the age—of—pension—acceptance
definition. The individual may or may not leave
the labor force earlier, depending on his response
to the increment to his lifetime income. Thus,
this too has an ambiguous effect.
D. Theoretical Conclusions
Life cycle theory has guided most existing theoretical
models of the effects of pensions and earnings on retirement.
Accordingly, in these models, how much work to do in each of
T periods of life depends on conditions in each and every
period.
A special case of lifetime labor supply modeling has
proved particularly tractable: the so-called "age—of—retirement
models." In this class of models, labor supply within a
period is dichotomous: the individual either works a specified
number of hours or doesn't work at all. Interesting results
for the effects of pensions on retirement emerge only from
the age—of-retirement literature. In contrast, variable hours
models have been unsuccessful in taking account of the effects
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of pensions on labor supply.
Theory suggests that six economic factors——-the net
wage stream on the main job, the net wage stream on an alternate
job, net private pension benefits, Social Security benefits,
private pension contributions, and Social Security contributions-—
play a central role in determining the age of retirement. Of
these, three have received serious consideration; they are the
wage stream on the main job, private pension benefits, and
Social Security benefits. The other three--the wage stream
on an alternate job, private pension contributions, and Social
Security contributions-——have largely been ignored.
How each of these variables enters into the retirement
decision has undergone a change of perception in the theoretical
literature. First generation models held that higher wages
induce later retirement and higher pension benefits induce
earlier retirement. More recent theoretical developments
have shown that these earlier surmises were not necessarily
correct. Theory has now shown that some wage increases can
lead to earlier retirement and some to later retirement.
Theory has also now shown that some pension increases lead to
earlier retirement and some to later retirement. These (ceteris
paribus) results may be summarized as follows:1
'In a highly-stylized "base case" (i.e., actuarially neutral
pensions, perfect capital markets lifetime known with certainty)
pensions have no effect on earnings. The results reported in
the text are for actuarially non—neutral pensions.
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'or an Income—Maximizer:
Variable
Increase in pension intercept
Increase in slope of pension function
Increase in earnings
Increase in pension contributions
Increase in wage on alternate job
Effect on Age-of-Retirement
Earlier
Arnb g uou s
Later
Earlier
Ambiguous
For a Utility-Maximizer:
Variable
Increase in pension intercept
Increase in slope of pension function
Increase in earnings
Increase in pension contributions
Increase in wage on alternate job
Effect on Age-of-Retirement
Earlier
Ambiguous
Anib g uou s
Anib g uou s
Ambiguous
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111. Empirical Models in the Literature
A. Specifications
This section, and the table on the following page,
summarize several key features pertaining to empirical
retirement models. The next section reviews specific empirical
findings on the determinants of retirement.
The table indicates clearly the great variety of dependent
variables examined in the literature. Most authors focus on
a simple probability of retirement, as measured at some
particular time, either on the survey date, some other year,
or by the time the individual attains a specified age.
Typically the definition of retirement is a labor force measure,
though a few authors equate accepting a pension with retirement.
Some models expand the choice set under examination to include
more options; for instance, a 3—way model involving retirement,
semi-retirement and full time work is the focus of the analyses
by Boskin, Hamermesh, Burkhauser and Quinn, and Gustman and
Steinmeier. Still other authors contemplate job change
patterns as a method of examining retirement (Burtless and
Hausman, for instance). Finally, a couple of empirical analyses
use a continuous variable such as hours of work (in the survey
week, for instance) as the labor supply measure of interest.
None of these summary measures of lifetime labor supply is
obviously superior to the others. No study examines hours of
work patterns in all possible years, as would be consistent
with the general theoretical life cycle labor supply model
sketched in Section I and II above. Despite the great diversity
of ways to define and analyze retirement, only Gustman and
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Steinmeier evaluate systematically the different empirical
results produced by different definitions of retirement. Further
work along these lines would be useful.
Empirical models also differ according to the ways in
which they specify the economic variables postulated to
influence retirement. Consider the six theoretical variables
which theory suggests determine older workers' labor supply——
namely, the net wage stream on the current job, the net wage
stream on an alternative lob, the net private pension benefit
and contribution streams, and the Social Security benefit
and contribution streams. To date, no empirical study takes
into account the current values of all six variables, let
alone their streams over time. For instance, Burkhauser's
(1976) work does a good job in using a discounted flow of
after—tax earnings, but assumes that the worker retired at
age 65 so earnings at other ages and in other jobs are ignored.
Gustman and Steinmeier are careful to include a wage rate on
post—retirement job, but omit consideration of taxes and
earnings streams. Measures of retirement benefits used in
the literature have some of the same drawbacks. Kotlikoff
nets out payroll taxes from a discounted flow of Social Security
benefits, which is more complete than others' measures; however,
he considers that variable for only one retirement date.
Pellechio (1981) and Burkhauser and Quinn do the best job of
including both private pension and Social Security income streams,
as well as changes in these streams if retirement were to be
postponed one year. Nonetheless changes in these streams if
retirement were postponed more than one year are ignored.
o.kin (1977) Various including
3-way modol de-
fining retired
1/4 tire work and
eemi—retirod 1/2
time,and not retired
otherwise.
Gross current annual
earnings if reported.
or imputed full—time
earnings.
Current reported bene-
fits if receiving Sc,
or imputed ''" fits if
not re'''d.
Cross .nef it (if
current ly rect' ivinq
pension), included
in nonlabor income
rs i
Various including
2—way model wh're
retired=zero hours
of work (also has
3- model).
Gross current hourly
wage; not current hourly
wage (gross minus income
n" rayroll tax).
Current reported bone- None
fits if receiving SS,
or imputed if not retired.
Surkhauser (1976) Probability of ac-
cepting early pen-
eion in 1965.
PV of expected gross
earnings if work from
current age until age
65, minus income tax
None Gross PPPF.LTA if
retired now vs. at
age 65.
Auto workers
nurkhauser and
uinn (1980)
Surtless and
Hausman (1980)
3—way model of prob-
ability of having
same job, new job,
no job next year.
3—way model of prob-
ability of being re-
tired, Federal em-
ployee, or private
Sector job next year.
Gross current hourly
wage in 1976 divided by
same in l973 imputed wage
in 1977 and interactions.
SSW at age 62.
SSW at age 62; SSDELTA
age 62 to 63.
SS benefits eligible for
in 1977/imputed wage 1977
and interactions with age.
Change in 55 replacement
rate if work in private
sector.
As above, but in- As above
cmi' taxes also
subtracted.
Proxied by industry
dummy variables.
Eligibility dummies; LRJS
Gross imputed PPW as
of earliest age of
elictihility; Gross im-
puted PPDELTA if re-
tired now vs. next year.
(Civil Service)
Gross Federal pen-
sion if retired .n
1977/imputed oross
wage 1977 and inter-
actions with age.
Clark and Johnson
(1980)
Probability inlabor force. Cross current hourlywage if reported, or
imputed.
Eligibility dummy; SSW
as of survey date.
Eligibility dummy;
PPW as of survey
date.
LRJtS
Cotter,nan (1978)
lordon and
(1980)
Blinder
Guatman and
Stein,neier (1981)
htswierse,h (1981)
l8urd and 805km (1980)
otlikoff (1979)
Pellechio (1978)
Various including
probability inlabor force, and
hours c rk.
Presents results
for probability of
labor force parti-
cipation.
Various. For ex-
ample, 3-way model
defining retired0
work, part-retired—
drop of more than
40% in wages or
hours on main job,
not retired otherwise.
Various. For ex-
ample, models de-
fining retired—no
work, semi-retired—
part time work, not
retired otherwise;
also uses % of full
time work in a year.
Probabilitl in
labor force,
Expected Retire—
ment age.
Probability in
labor force.
Gross reported hourly
wage in 1966.
PV of gross imputed
annual earnings from
current age to -e 67.
Gross imputed hourly
on main job at ane
63 (4 brackets); Gross
imputed hourly wage on
alternative job at age
66—7 (4 brackets).
Proxies
Gross current reported
hourly wage plus in-
crease in PV of Social
Security earnings base
if work one more year.
Croas current reported
earnings minus income
tax, plet both employer
end employee 5$ payroll
tax.
Gross reported average
annual earning.; Dummy
it earnings exceed Social
Security earning, ceiling.
SSW as of 1966.
55W as of age 65 divided
by PV gross annual im-
puted earnings from
current age to 67.
Eligibility dummies
SSW as of two years
before survey.
SSW if retire now.
SSW as of see 65 minus PV
of payroll taxes if work
until age 65; Current SS
benefits eligible for
divided by current gross
full time earnings.
SSW as of current age
Gross PPW as of
1966.
N L5
Elil;ibility dumssies LPJIS
Eligibility dummies LRI3S
PPW as of two years LRIS
before survey.
Cross PPW included LRHS
in net nonlabor in-
come variable (bracket
categories)
Eligibility dummies NLS
None I PS —Cl' S -;
'caCt M,
FIIC
S •1
—42—
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF TUE EFFECTS OF EARNINGS AND PENSIOtS ON RETIPEtENT
Economic Factors Used as F.xnlanatnrv ttariahles
Dependent Social Private DataVariable(2) Earnings(3) •SecurXT) PensionsT Source
3oskin and Hurd (1978)
aurkhauser (1979)
Burkhauaer (1980)
LPH S
As above As above
Probability of Sc— Gross current annual
cepting Social reported earnings atSecurity at age 62. age 61.
None
Gross current imputed
hourly wage.
I PS -CPS —S A
Extct Match
File
Federal
employees
PV of gross reported 55W as of current ago;
annual earnings up to PV ot pa','r'll if
Solal Security earnings retire now .LF.LTA if
ceiling, 1 rn age retired now vs. next year,
entered workforco to Current 55 annual benefits
present; Average gross (imputed).
repor -' annual earnings.
Cross cerr"nt hourly
waae, reported or im—
pu ted.
Various including Eligibility dummy; Eligibility durr.y; NLS
probability retired Current SS benefit, Current gross dollar
(self reported) , and if receiving SS. benefit if receiving
expected retirement Pension.
ago.
Probability cc- Gross reported annual 55W as of age one year Eligibility dummy: LRUS
cepted SS benefits, earnings jr year before before survey SSDF.LTA current gross dollar
survey. if retired now vs. next benefit if receiving
year divided by benefit pension.
foregone.
Notes to Table:
Columns 3-5
PVpresent value of a stream of income, usually discounted for the probability of mortality.
PPW= Private pension wealth defined here as the present value (PV) of the stream of private pension benefits received if
retirement occurs in a given year, until death.
SS.'Social Sectrity benefits.
SSW—Social Security Wealth, defined here as the present value (PV) of the stream of Social Security benefits if retirement occurs
in a given year, until death.
PPDELTA—difference between PPW in a given year and PPW if retirement is postponed until the next year.
SSDELTA=difference between SSW in a given year and SSW if retirement is postponed until the next year.
Column 6
IRS-CPS-SSA Exact Match File contains a sample of people surveyed by the Current Population Survey with matched information from
tax and Social Security files.
LRKS is the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, containing information on a sample of people taken from the Social Security's
longitudinal data files.
NLS is the National Longitudinal Survey, otherwise known as the Parnes Data, containing data on (among other groups) middle
age stales.
PSID is the Panel Survey of :ncome Dynamics containing information on several thousand families and individuals.
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STUDIES OF TIlE EFFECTS OF EPNltJES AND PENSIONS ON P.ETIREMENTSUMMARY OF EMPIRICAl,
Dependent
Variable
(2)
Probabilit,
labor force.
Probability in
labor f"rce.
Economic Factors Used as Explantwy Variables
Social Private
Security Pensions
--v-_ (5)
pellechio (1980)
Quinn (1)17)
Reliners (1977)
Sammartino (1980)
Data
Source
It)
Eligibility dummy
Gross reported current
hourly wage.
None ims-Cr's- t'Fvict ttehfile
Eligibility dummy LRI)S
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It is clear then, that most writers use only current
values of explanatory variables, rather than the theoretically
appropriate streams of economic variables over the individual's
remaining lifetime. The implication is that most empirical
studies suffer from omitted variables and measurement error
that may well bias results; implications of these problems
should be examined by future researchers.
In order to address many of these issues, however,
what is required is more and better data on the determinants
of older workers' labor supply patterns than are now available.
Existing surveys are deficient on several counts: they provide
incomplete earnings data, they often contain too little in-
formation to determine Social Security benefits, and generally
reveal next to nothing about the private pension plan rules
confronted by employees. Some surveys are very sketchy indeed,
reporting only whether a worker is eligible for a private
pension or Social Security rather than benefit levels and the
structure of benefits as retirement is postponed. Others do
more: for instance, the LRHS (see Table) can be used to
compute Social Security benefits, but contains only sketchy
private pension data. The Auto Workers' sample, on the other
hand, may be used to derive benefits for different retirement
ages but is silent on Social Security benefits to which
workers are entitled. Most surveys contain no information on
contribution schedules for private pension plans at all, and
often do not report enough data to determine tax rates for
individual workers. In part, these data problems account
for the failure of empirical analysts to include all the
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relevant life cycle variables in empirical models. More
complete survey information on workers' characteristics, and
the structures of their earnings, pension and Social Security
benefit streams would be invaluable.
B. Empirical Results
This section briefly summarizes what we have learned
empirically about the effects of economic variables on
older workers' labor supply. Of special interest are estimates
of the impact of wages, pensions, and Social Security on
retirement.1 As we have shown above, the life cycle context
requires that the empirical analyst consider the theoretically
important streams of wage and retirement income. Lacking this,
we conclude at the outset that most of the empirical studies
do no tell us much about the
effects of wage and pension
streams on retirement behavior. Therefore, this discussion
a
Some of the studies discussed below, and others in the
literature, develop empirical models of expected rather than
actual labor supply patterns. For instance Reimers used theplanned age of retirement as a dependent variable, as didKotljkoff and Hall and Johnson. One problem with this is
that many individuals report that they never will retire, yetempirical analysts sometimes make ad hoc assumptions about
-when retirement will actually take place. For instance,
Kotlikoff assigns a retirement date of age 70 to those workers
who state that they will
never retire. However, a more funda--
mental problem is that planned retirement ages differ sub-
stantially from many workers' actual retirement ages. ReimersConcludes that "the connection between expected and actualbehavior is loose. Most men predict their own retirement date
wrong." (p. 150). In addition she finds that the prediction
error is not associated with
wage and pension variables in
any significant way. A systematic analysis of the factors
Tnaking planned and actual retirement dates differ is a worth-
while endeavour for future researchers. -
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is confined to an overview of the partial information
available. 1
Wages. Two kinds of wages influence retirement:
the wage stream available on the workerts present job, and
the wage stream available from some alternative employer.2
A parallel shift in the wage profile on the present job
has both substitution and income effects and they work in
opposite directions. An increase in the rate of wage growth
has an additional intertemporal substitution effect, which,
by itself, leads to postponed retirement. Thus, theory
suggests that the present job's wage stream (including both
wage level and wage growth) affects the age of retirement
and that both of these effects are ambiguous in sign. None-
theless, most analysts include current wage only and hypothesize
that the effect of a higher current wage is later retirement.
From theory, a higher wage available from an alternative
employer encourages earlier retirement from the present job,
since income and substitution effects work in the same direction
for the decision to leave the principal employer; however, a
higher wage from an alternative employer has an ambiguous effect
1Another empirical study on pensions is that of Schiller and
Weiss..(1979). We exclude it because the authors do not have avail-
able information on whether a worker left to retire, whether
he quit, or whether he was laid off or fired from his firm.
Thus it is not informative on the effects of pensions on
retirement.
2Presumably, net or disposable earnings are the relevant
economic variable to use, after having substracted income
and Social Security taxes, and required pension contribu-
tions if any. However, net earnings have been used in
few empirical studies.
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on the date of labor force withdrawal, since income and
substitution effects work in opposite directions for the
withdrawal decision. Most empirical analysts in the retire-
ment field examine the effects of wages on the main job only.
However, one study, by Gustman and Steinmeier, exploits the
longitudina,l character of panel data to impute wages avail-
able in alternative jobs.
Turning to empirical results, we find:
Current Wages. Many studies discern no statistically
significant effect of changes in the current wage: Cotterman,
Hurd and Boskin, Quinn, and Reimers are in this group.
Pellechio (1981') found that current wages had a statistically
insignificant effect on retirement for all age groups but one,
the over—65 (where the effect was negative). Gustman and
Steinmeier do not report significance levels but state that
the current wage measures they use had no impact on the probability
of retirement. On the other hand several studies find that
higher current wages deter retirement in a statistically
significant way: studies reaching this conclusion are Boskin,
Boskin and Hurd (with their gross wage measure), Burkhauser
(1980), Burkhauser and Quinn, Clark and Johnson, Kotlikoff,
Pellechio (1978), and Sammartino (1980). One study reaches
the opposite conclusion, finding that higher current wages
have a statistically significant effect inducing earlier
retirement (Boskin and Hurd's net wage Tneasure)) Empirically,
higher wage levels do not have a systematically strong impact
'The study by Hall and Johnson finds that the current hourly
wage was positively and significantly associated with planned
earlier retirement.
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on retirement, though when statistically significant, higher
wages result in later retirement.
Wage Streams. The disagreement over empirical results
is reiterated in studies that develop a measure of the wage
stream available to a worker on his present job. Burkhauser
(1976,1979) concludes that a worker has a significantly higher
probability of continuing to work when the present value (PV)
of the earnings stream rises. Gordon and Blinder agree with
this conclusion but present rio significance levels for their
retirement results. Pellechio (1981) finds that higher PV of
earnings has no effect on any groups, except males over age
65, where the effect is to reduce the likelihood of retirement.1
Higher wage streams, when statistically significant, tend to
encourage later retirement.
Wages from an Alternative Employer. The one study with
clearcut answers on this issue is that by Gustman and Steinmeier.
They find that a higher alternative wage has a statistically
significant hut small impact on behavior, by reducing the
probability of withdrawing from the labor force. They do not
present statistical significance levels for the effect of this
wage measure on other behaviors, such as the probability of
leaving the main job.2
'Burtless and Hausman find that workers with higher wage growth
are significantly less likely to retire, but the fact that
several wage variables are included interactively in their model
makes it difficult to sort out a pure wage response.
2Burtless and Hausman include a measure of earnings on an
alternative job, via an imputed 1977 wage term; however the
complex nonlinear and interactive ways in which it enters the
model makes it difficult to sort out the impact on retirement.
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Contributions. Most of the analysts mentioned above
utilize earnings measures that are gross of pension contributions.
However, when a pension plan requires workers to contribute,
the worker's net pay is less than his gross pay. In the model
by Boskin and Hurd, current gross earnings are reduced by the
Social Security payroll tax, and they find that increases
in the net wage significantly encourage retirement.' Pellechio
(1981) finds a similar result with a different variable; he
uses the PV of payroll taxes a worker has paid over his life-
time until the present as a separate regressor, and concludes
that lower taxes significantly encourage retirement.2 Only
one empirical piece, Gordon and Blinder's, directly examines
private pension contributions in a retirement model.3 -However,
these authors assume that benefits eoual contributions for
each individual, so that the separate impacts of pension benefit
and cost streams are impossible to disentangle.
Social Security. Theory suggests that a higher value of
Social Security benefits at first eligibility (age 62) induces
earlier retirement, whereas the effect of a higher rate of in-
crease in Social Security benefits is ambiguous. Empirical
evidence, though limited, is available on each of these propo-
sitions. The results are inconclusive.
'Kotlikoff uses yet a different earnings measure to evaluate
the determinants of expected retirement ages. This is an
annual labor earnings term which is net of income taxes but
gross of both the employer's and employee's Social Security
contribution. The interpretation of such a wage measure is
unclear, since retirement depends on a comparison of net
returns from work vis a vis pension income.
variable is tautologically endogenous because when a worker
retires earlier, he pays payroll taxes for fewer years.
3The pension contribution variable is an imputed measure, since
it was not reported in their data set.
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Some studies used data sets which measured only Social
Security eligibility, not the dollar amount of benefits. Quinn,
as well as Clark and Johnson, discern a positive relationship
between own eligibility for Social Security and retirement.
This finding that Social Security eligibility is associated with
earlier retirement is what theory would predict. A second study
that measured Social Security eligibility finds just the opposite
—--Reimers reports a negative effect of Social Security eligi-
bility on the probability of retirement.
Other authors utilize measures of dollar benefits for
which the individual is currently eligible but are not able
to measure the streams of Social Security benefits. These
results are in disagreement too: the studies by Boskin, Boskin
and Hurd, and Pellechio (1981) fixxd that higher current Social
Security benefits significantly encourage retirement, whereas
Reimers and Kotlikoff find that higher benefit levels have no
impact on retirement.2
Following in Feldstein's footsteps, several researchers
develop a measure of the present value of Social Security
benefits (SS) over the remainder of the individual's lifetime.
Typically researchers compute only one value of SSW as of the
date of the survey, or some other date. Pellechio (1978,81) uses
such a measure and finds that SSW significantly encourages the
probability of being retired. This conclusion is reiterated
1Gustman and Steinmeier report eligibility deters retirement
but do not provide statistical significance levels.
2The variables representing levels of Social Security benefits
used by Burtless and Hausman are not statistically significant,
though complex interaction terms make intepretation difficult.
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in Burkhauser (1980), and Hurd and Boskin.1 However, Harnerrnesh
and Clark and Johnson reach the opposite conclusion: in these
studies, higher levels of own Social Security wealth signifi-
cantly deter retirement. No significant impact is discerned
by Burkhauser and Quinn, Cotterman, Kotlikoff and Sammartino
(1980).
Other authors go further in incorporating measures of
Social Security benefits streams available to a worker should
he postpone retirement. Some authors find no effect: for
instance Sarninartino (1980) computes the difference in SSW if
the worker retires one year later, but finds that it does not
significantly influence retirement. The same variable sig-
nificantly encourages retirement in Burkhauser and Quinn, but
deters retirement in Pellechio's (1981) study.
In summary, our literature review indicates that retire—
inent is affected ambiguously by Social Security eligibility,
by current dc'llar benefits, by Social Security wealth, and
by the change in Social Security wealth. No study includes
values of Social Security benefits available at all possible
retirement dates. Clearly, no empirical conclusion can be
drawn about t.he effects of Social Security on retirement.
Private Pensions. Theory suggest that a higher private
pension benefit level in the year of first eligibility
induces earUer retirement, whereas the effect of a higher
'Gordon and Blinder's finding is consistent with these four
but no statistical significance levels are given.
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rate of increase in private pension benefits is ambiguous.
Evaluating the effects of pensions in empirical data has been
difficult, however, since information on the structures of
private pensions is very poor. Data sets with national
coverage, such as the NLS and the LRHS (see Table) seldom have
information on pension levels, and never report how pension
benefits would change if the worker postponed retirement.
Only the Auto Workers' sample used by Burkhauser provided the
requisite information.
Because of such data limitations, researchers have often
been limited to constructing eligibility dummies reflecting
private pension coverage) Quinn's research concludes that
people eligible for private pensions are significantly -more
likely to leave the labor force than those without pensions.
This conclusion is reiterated by Gordon and Blinder, as well
as by Gustman and Steinmeier, though neither study reports
significance levels. Clark and Johnson find that males react
as expected (eligibility is posItively associated with retire—
ment), but females who are covered tend to remain in the labor
force.2 On the other hand there is room for diversity of
opinion here too: the studies by Reimers, Burkhauser and Quinn,
and Kotlikoff, report that people with pensions are significantly
less likely to leave the labor force. Samrnar-tino (1980) finds
1Many empirical studies omit private pension variables altogether;
see Table.
2The authors suggest that women covered by private pensions may
be more career oriented than women without this coverage,
which might explain their lower retirement probability.
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no significant effect of private pension coverage.'
Three studies, by Boskin, Burtless and Hausman, Sarnmartjno
(1980) examine the impact of current pension benefit levels.
Boskin reports that higher benefit levels are significantly
related to the probability of being retired rather than
working; the latter two studies however, find no significant
impact on retirement.
A few recent studies develop measures of private pension
wealth, analogous to the SSW variable described above.2
Clark and Johnson, and Hamermesh, find that higher private
pension wealth is positively and significantly associated
with retirement, among males. For females, however, Clark
and Johnson discover that higher PPW significantly lowers
the probability of retirement. An equivalent measure in
Cotterman's work, and that of Burkhausr and Quinn, is found
to have no effect on retirement.3
Three empirical analyses evaluate the PDV of the difference
between the private pension one would receive if one retired now,
and the annual pension that could be received if retirement
were postponed a year. Burkhauser (1976, 1979) reports that
the Auto Workers in his sample retired significantly earlier
1Hall and Johnson report that private pension eligibility is
PSotively associated with planned early retirement.
20f course the relevant economic variable is after—tax private
pension amounts, though only one study corrected for taxes
(Burkhauser, 1979).
3Hurd and Boskin include pensIon wealth in a nonearned income
variable and find a negative effect on retirement. However,
the interpretation of this term is difficult since the effect
of pension wealth is confounded with other nonearned incomeSources.
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when they faced a larger decline in their private pension
wealth as retirement was postponed. Burkhauser and Quinn reach
the same conclusion using the LR}IS data set.
On balance then, the evidence (when significant) is
reasonably consistent with theory: current eligibility for a
private pension has an ambiguous effect on retirement, but
higher current benefit levels tend to encourage retirement.
However, even the best empirical studies have considered the
patterns of pension benefits only at two possible retirement
ages. No one has modeled the entire stream of pension oppor-
tunities available to the older worker. Better data on private
pension levels and rules are required to derive better estimates
of the effects of pensions on retirement.
-
C. Summary
In sum, our review of the empirical literature suggests
that:
-
(1) Higher wages from the principal employer, when statis-
tically significant, are associated with later retirement.
(2) Higher wages on an alternate job have been considered
in only one study; they have a small negative effect
on retirement.
(3) Contributions to private pensions have not received
empirical attention independent of benefit streams.
• (4) Contributions to Social Security have been considered
independently of Social Security benefits in one
study, in which they were found to deter retirement.
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(5) Higher Social Security benef its have an amgibuous
effect on retirement.
(6) Higher private pension benefits tend to encourage
retirement though the evidence is somewhat mixed.
Existing empirical studies have not incorporated even the
majority of the relevant wage and pension variables determining
older workers' life cycle labor supply and retirement patterns,
and hence are subject to serious specification errors. The
links between life cycle theory and empirical analysis are
weak. Data limitations are severe. Until these deficiencies
are remedied, the empirical effects of pensions and earnings
on retirement will remain uncertain.
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